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In this paper we consider an overlapping generations model with endogenous fer-
tility and two-sided altruism and show the limitations of applying commonly used
open loop Nash equilibrium in characterizing equilibrium transfers from parents to
children in the form of bequest, and transfers from children to parents as voluntary
old-age support. Since in ourmodel childrenare concerned withparents’ old-age con-
sumption, agents have incentives to save less for old age and to have more children
so as to strategically induce their children to transfer more old-age support. We for-
mulate such strategic behavior within a sequential multi-stage game and introduce a
notion of learning equilibriumto characterize equilibriummanipulative behavior and
then study the consequences of such strategic manipulations on private intergenera-
tional transfers, fertility and savings decisions, and on Pareto optimality of equilib-
rium allocation. We show that the learning equilibrium notion of the paper simpliﬁes
computationof subgame perfect equilibrium,subgame perfect equilibriumis thelong-
run outcome of dynamic learning equilibriumpaths (this aids in selecting, sometimes,
a unique equilibrium among multiple subgame perfect equilibria), and an open-loop
Nash equilibrium involves ”incredible” threats from children. We provide an alter-
native explanation for the existence of publicly provided social security program and
examine its role to correct distortionscreated by strategic manipulation.
Keywords: two-sided altruism, endogenous fertility, subgame perfect manipula-
tion of children, social security.
￿An earlier draft under a different title was presented at the 1994 winter meetings of the Econometric
Society, January 3-5, Boston, Ma. I would like to thank Vince Crawford, Marc Nerlove, and Joel Sobel for
many usefulcomments.
11 Introduction
In standard pure exchange overlapping generations (OLG) economies agents are assumed
to have life-cycle utility functions. These models do not explain private intergenerational
transfers withinfamily and have no bearings on the effects of publictransfers policies such
as social security on private intergenerational transfers, savings and fertility. Moreover,
competitive equilibrium fails to be Pareto optimal; however, a suitably designed pay-as-
you-go (PAYG) social security program can remove inefﬁciencies by allowing transfers
from children to parents that are necessary for Pareto optimality but would not be possible
in a decentralized competitive equilibrium due to lack of individual incentives for such
transfers (see for instance, Samuelson [1958]).
In another framework Becker [1974] establishes his ”Rotten Kid Theorem” that under
certaincircumstanceswhenparentscare abouttheirchildren’swelfare, childrentakeactions
that maximize the jointfamily income even thoughchildren do notcare about theirparents,
providedparents leave positivebequestto their children. One implicationof his Rotten Kid
Theorem is that a forced transfer between children and parents have no ultimate effect on
equilibriumoutcome, since parentscan off-set thisforced intergenerationaltransfer bysuit-
ably adjusting their bequest level.1 Barro [1974] uses the above kind of intergenerational
altruism in an OLG framework and shows that social security has no effect on savings so
longasinequilibriumagentsleave positivebequestinallperiods. Furthermore, since Barro
model is equivalentto one with ﬁnite number of inﬁnitelylived agents, a competitive equi-
librium is Pareto optimal; hence social security is not required for the purpose of attaining
Pareto optimalityof equilibrium allocation.
Neither strand of above literature explain why transfers from children to parents are
observed in many economies, and why the amount of transfers declines with the introduc-
tion of public transfer policies; why a PAYG social security program exists, and whether
it is possible for the current living generations to legislate a PAYG social security beneﬁts
scheme for the current and all future generations such that the future generations will have
noincentivestoamend it;and if onesuchprogram exists, doesitlead tooptimalallocation?
A few attempts have been made, however, to explain the existence of PAYG social se-
curity programs in frameworks that treat fertility exogenously. One type of explanations
postulate that there could be economy of scale and other sources of market failures in pen-
sion provision (see, Diamond [1977]) or there might be adverse selection/moral hazard
problems in private provision of retirement income insurance and these could be mitigated
by compulsory participation (see Diamond and Mirrlees [1978]). These can explain intro-
duction of fully funded system but cannot explain the existence of PAYG system.
Among the other type of explanations, Browning [1975] considers a voting model of
social security in an OLG framework in which the old outvote the young to enact a PAYG
social security system. It is not, however, clear in Browning’s framework why then the
1See Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers [1985] for a critique of the Rotten Kid Theorem.
2old do not use their power to enact a legislation to extract all income from the young.
Hansson and Stuart [1989] provide an alternative explanation by modeling PAYG social
security legislation as a trade among living generations. They consider an OLG model in
which agents are assumed to derive utility not only from their own young age and old-age
consumptionbutalsofrom properlydiscountedyoungageandold-ageconsumptionoftheir
parents and of all future generations. They ﬁnd conditions under which the young and old
agents unanimously agree upon a stream of PAYG social security transfers for the current
and all future generations such that the resulting allocation is Pareto optimal and that no
future generations have incentives to amend the program.
Veall [1986] provides an alternative explanation for PAYG program by considering an
OLG model in which each agent is assumed to derive utilitynotonlyfrom his/her ownlife-
cycle consumption, but also from the level of old-age consumption of his/her parents. Due
tothisconsumptionexternality,elderlymay savelittletoextractthemaximumpossiblegifts
from their children; ”This can lead to an inferior steady state, where no one is consuming
’enough’inretirement”(Veall[1986,p.250). If aPAYGsocialsecuritysystemisintroduced
such that it transfers from the youngto the old at least the amount that the old could extract
from their children by saving nothing, such a social security program could restore inter-
temporal efﬁciency of consumption for each agent and Pareto optimality for the whole
society. However, once the agents begin to save, the young may like to reduce their social
security contribution and have incentive to amend the PAYG social security legislation.
Thus such a PAYG systemmay not be stable. Veall showsthat if social security beneﬁts are
set at the level of optimal steady-state old-age consumption, then such a legislationwill be
honored by all future generations and thus is stable. Moreover, the resulting allocationwill
be Pareto optimal.
If agents expect to receive gifts from theirchildren to supportold-ageconsumption,it is
clear that not only savings decisions but also the fertility decisions will be affected; in fact,
agents would like to have more children.2 Empirical analyses of cross country data as well
as householdsurvey data predominantlyshowthat social securityaffects bothfertilitylevel
and savings rate (see for instance, Nugent [1985] for a summary of these studies). Hence,
it is important to relax the exogenous fertility assumption in the above class of models.
In morerecent modelsthat studyeffects ofsocialsecurityon fertilityandsavings(Barro
and Becker [1989], and Raut [1992]) the existence of social security is not explained.
Nishimura and Zhang [1992] include fertility choices in Veall’s one-sided altruism frame-
work. Following Veall, they view the optimal old-age consumption in the steady-state as
PAYG social security beneﬁts. However, when fertility is also a choice variable, it is not
possible to implement the optimal steady-state allocation using only a PAYG social secu-
rity policy instrument; this was possiblein Veall’s framework because he treated fertilityas
exogenous; in fact, once such a PAYG social security program is enacted, the free rider’s
problem will cripple the system since an individual agent will have no incentive to have
children (as they do not affect utility but cost money) and would like to depend on others’
2This is an alternative formulation of old-age security hypothesis.
3childrentocontributetosocialsecurityprogram. Since every bodywoulddothesame, such
a social security program is not individually rational. Therefore, viewing optimal steady-
state giftsas a form of PAYG social securityin Veall’s framework loses bothnormative and
positivevirtues once fertilityis a choice variable.
In this paper, we extend Veall’s framework to rectify some of these problems. We as-
sume thatagents derive utilitynotonlyfrom theirown youngage andold age consumption,
but also from old-age consumptionof their parents and the young age consumptionof their
children weighted by the number of children. This allows us to endogenize within family
transfers in both directions (i.e., from children to parents as gifts and from parents to chil-
dren as bequest); moreover, in ourframework even when parents do not receive any old-age
support they have individualincentives to have children.
In the overlapping generationsframework, as in real life, householddecisionsare made
sequentially: in any given period, decisions regarding fertility, savings and intergenera-
tional transfers of past generations and of the currently alive old generation that are made
in the past are known to the current decision makers. When agents make their decisions
they use all available information. Moreover, since agents know that their actions are ob-
served by their children and hence will affect their children’s decisions, they will take into
account the incentive effects of their decisions on their children, and thus try to manipu-
late their children to get the best out of them. For instance, if an agent saves more for his
retirement, then his children will transfer less income to the agent when he retires. Since
the agent knows that his children react that way to his savings decisions, he might ﬁnd it
strategically advantageous to save little and have more children to extract higher transfers
from his children. Much of the previous literature in this area ignores the sequentialnature
of the above overlapping decisions and apply the notion of open loop Nash equilibrium to
characterize equilibrium outcomes. Open loop Nash equilibrium makes sense only when
agents must commit to entire time paths of decisions without observing anyone else’s. In
open loop Nash equilibrium, agents take the actions of other agents as given but not their
reactions and thus do not take proper account of the incentives that they face. We modify
it by assuming that agents take the reaction functions of their children while making their
own decisions,and introducea notionof learningequilibrium. We showthat the more rele-
vantbut analyticallyintractablesubgame perfect equilibriumis a particular typeof learning
equilibrium, which can be computed as a ﬁxed point of a function of single variable, that
the long-run outcome of a dynamic learning equilibrium path, and that open loop Nash
equilibriumrequires a certain type of ”incredible” threats.
In section2, we set up our basic model and discussthe nature of coordinationproblems
that the agents face, and compute the open loop Nash equilibrium. In section 3, we deﬁne
andcomputelearningequilibria,andcharacterize open-loopNashequilibriumandsubgame
perfect equilibriumin terms of learning equilibrium. In section 4 we introduce pay-as-you-
go socialsecurity program and studyitseffect on populationgrowth,aggregate savingsand
private intergenerationaltransfers in subgame perfect equilibrium. Section 5 concludes the
paper.
42 Basic Framework
We use the basic Samuelsonian [1958] overlapping generations framework and introduce
two-sided altruism to endogenize intergenerational transfers. Let us assume that time is
discrete and is denoted as
t
= 0, 1, 2, ....; each person lives for three periods: young,
adult, and old. While young he is dependent on his parents for all decisions. We follow











1 denote respectively the adult age and old-age
consumptionof an adultof periodt; however,
n
t denotes the number of childrenof an adult
of period t, since we assume that only adults can have children, so from the subscriptof
n
t






t and the interest rate
r
t are exogenously given.
2.1 Households
We assume that all children are born identical and they all behave identically in a given
situation. We would like to derive agent’s behavior regarding fertility, savings and inter-
generational transfers from utility maximization. We model an individual’sconcern for his
parents and children by assuming that an adult of generation t derives utility from his own
life-cycle consumption and from consumption level of his children and parents that he ob-
serves during his active life-time (for a justiﬁcation of these type of utility functions, see




































































When there are many siblings, an individual may not care about his parents as intensely
as he would do if he were the only child. In the above speciﬁcation of utility function,
we allow the degree of an individual’sconcern for his parents to depend on the number of





In our economy, agents have interdependent utility functions: an agent’s utility is af-
fected by the amount of consumption of other family members. Thus, the agents have
incentives to transfer part of their income to their parents and children. The decisions that
are to be made by a representative adult of period t,
t
￿
1 are as follows:
An adult of period
t earns wage income
w
t in the labor market and expects to receive
a bequest
b
t from his parents. These two sources of income constitute his budget during





0 units of period t good. Given his
adulthood budget, he decides the amount of savings
s









0; in the next period, he retires







































































































Table 1: Time table of actions by overlapping generationsof agents



















), on the levels of hisown life cycle
consumption and the levels of consumption of his parents and children in the periods that















































































































































































0decides the level of bequest
b









































































0 is an equilibrium combination of gifts and bequest












t,f o rs m a l l
￿
>
0 ; this can lead to gift-bequest war.
This could be handled by restricting to open loop Nash equilibria that yield either positive
bequestorpositivegiftwithinaperiodbutnotboth. Tohandletheseproblems,anopen-loop
Nash equilibriumis often used, we deﬁne it as follows:








0 is feasible if there exists an associated sequence

















1 such that it satisﬁes the budget con-
straints (2)-(7).








































































































0 form a feasible sequence of strategies, and
~
￿
t yields higher utility for agent
t.
We further distinguishamong different types of equilibria. An open-loop bequest equi-




































0. There could be also equilibriain which bequests are oper-
ative in some periods and gifts are operative in other periods. In this paper we will analyze
only open-loop gift equilibria. It can be seen easily from the ﬁrst order conditions of the
open loop Nash equilibrium that in general there is indeterminacy in the set of such equi-
libria. This indeterminacy is symptomatic of Nash equilibria with interdependent utility
functions. For our purpose, we focus only on steady-state open loop gift equilibria which
are determinate.





























We denote all steady-state endogenous variables with a
￿
; and drop the time scripts.















1. Since this stationarity
assumptionis notcritical to theissuesof thepaper, to simplifyexposition,we willmaintain






2 respectively the adult




































￿. The ﬁrst order necessary



































; and study the effect of growth rate
g on fertility savings, and old-age















































































In the followingexample we show thecoexistence of uniquesteady-stateopen loopgift









2.2 An Example: (CEM Economy)
The instantaneousutilityfunction satisﬁes the following:















































The signiﬁcance of this assumption is that parents care about consumption of all children





































































































































































is less than wage income in gift equilibrium. The intercept of equation (14) is positive if
￿
<
1 , inwhichcasetheslopesare negativeforbothlinesandwecannotguaranteethatthey
will intersect in the positive orthant. However, if
￿
>
1 , equation (14) will have negative
intercept and positive slope. If
￿ is sufﬁciently larger than one, then it will intersect with























































































































one can easily verify that (10) is satisﬁed with strict inequality.




0 ,a n d
we ﬁnd an equilibriumfor the above setof parameters, such an equilibriumcouldbe found.






























































It could be seen readily that the graph of these two non-linear functions intersect only























































furthermore, the constraints(10) and (11) are satisﬁed as strict inequalities.
Comparing these two open-loop gift equilibria we ﬁnd that the equilibrium with zero
savings has higher levels of fertility, transfers from children and welfare of a representative
agent than the gift equilibrium with positive savings. How reasonable are these equilibria?
We begin our enquiry startingwith the remarks of the next subsection.
2.3 Remarks on open-loop equilibrium
An open loop Nash equilibrium framework does not fully model the incentives that agents
may have to manipulate their parents’ or their children’s behavior to extract more transfers
from them. For instance, since parents make their consumptionand fertilitydecisions prior
to their children’s, parents may ﬁnd it strategically advantageous to consume more in their
working age, save little on physical assets and possibly have more children so that when
9they become old they have little income of their own. When the children ﬁnd that their old
parents have little to consume, they will have sympathy for their parents since they care
abouttheir parents’ consumption;thus they willtransfer a larger amountof old-age support
than what they would be transferring in the open loop Nash equilibrium. The children in
turncanmanipulatetheirchildreninthesame wayandbebetter-offasa result. Thisprocess
might be self-fulﬁlling over time. In the next section, we will see that this is true, and we
will also pointout other problems with the concept open-loop equilibrium.
3 Manipulation and Subgame Perfection
In our formulation,we assume a particular typeof informationstructure inthe decisiontree
of overlappinggenerationsofagentssothatwe are able tocomputeand studytheproperties










t) at whichthe liveagents of periodt are
to make decisions. At stage
t





















)as wellas alldecisionsof the previousgenerationsare partof historyand
















1 decides to bequeath
b
t to each of his children and each of his children decides
the fraction of their income,
a
t to be given as gift to their parents. Both agents make their
decisions simultaneously and independently. The game moves to stage
t
:
1 at which both
agents observe the outcome of stage
t





















further household decision, agent
t












1 knowsthat his children will use the informationregarding his observable
actions, he will choose his actions in each stage that exploits the reactions of his children
in most favorable way. Or in other words, parents may ﬁnd it beneﬁcial to manipulate their
children’s behavior.
Let us denote by
H
t the set of all possible histories up to time t. We follow the
convention of denoting an agent
a with a superscript and stage































































Note thatthe above setof feasible bequestdecisionsdependon the history
h
t, especially on




1’s feasible actions are
























Similarly, given the history
h
















































































1 have chosen their actions in stage
t of period
t,




1,a n dt h eg a m em o v e st os t a g e
t
:










































































































). Figure 1 depicts a part











of a branch describesthe actionof the agent that it correspondsto; the shaded boxes are the






() ns tt ,
b t + 1
a t + 1










In the above set-up, agents in later stages can use very complex punishment rules as
11their strategies. For instance, an agent
t
=
5in stage 5 can conditionhis actionsas follows:
”he willtransfer a certain fraction
a
5 of his income to his parents if his parents
transferred a certain fraction
a
4 of their income to the agent’s grandparents,
saved certain amount
s
4, had certain number of children,
n
4, and if his grand
parents transferred a certain fraction
a
3 of their income to the agent’s grand
grand parents, ... and so on.”
While these types of strategies may lead to many subgame perfect equilibria, the equi-
libria that prescribe strategies conditioning on the dead grand parents are hard to execute
since it is not possible to objectively verify if the agent’s grand parents or grand grand
parents did such and such.
Using the Markovian structure of our economy, and the fact that utility functions de-
pend onlyon parent’sold-age and the children’syoungage consumption,we restrict the set
offeasibleactionsthatconditionsonlyontheactionswhichdirectlyaffect an agent’sutility.






















1’s own past decisions. From equations (2)-(5), and the arguments of the
utilityfunction, it is clear that the only information from history that is relevant to decision
















ing his bequest decision
b















and in making agent
t’s gift decision
a



















t’s actions depend on his own past deci-
sion
a
t and his parent’s bequest decision
b
t



















































































). When actionsat any stage are functionsof past actions, they are gener-
ally known as reaction functions. Putting all the actions and reactions of agent t from all























































































1 now belong to function spaces, whereas in open loop











































































































































if at any stage
t















































t is a Nash equilibrium
of the stage
















































the optimal actions of agent t, when it is assumed that all the future moves will be made










Similar to open loop Nash equilibrium, we can deﬁne subgame perfect gift equilibrium
and subgame perfect bequest equilibrium. However, in the rest of the paper we analyze
only the properties of the subgame perfect gift equilibria.






























































1 be any feasible actions of agent
t
￿
1.T a k i n g




















































)that maximizes his utility. For
t
>
1 , the ﬁrst order necessary













































































































































































































































































































































In our framework, a subgame perfect equilibriumwith differentiable reaction functions
may not exist. Even if we assume that there exists one, it is not possible to compute all
subgame perfect gift equilibrium reaction functions from the above ﬁrst order conditions.4
Therefore, we explore the above system of equations to ﬁnd a steady-state local subgame
perfect gift equilibrium as follows:
4See Kohlberg [1976] for a discussionof such problems in a similar framework.




















Deﬁnition 3 A steady-state local subgame perfect gift equilibrium is a vector of fertility





























































































































































































It isnot possibleto compute all the steady-stateequilibriumreaction functionsfrom the

























only through his own past action,
a
t





; parent’s old-age con-




t cannot affect it. As a consequence







opposed to recursively, we can treat these actions as scalars instead of reaction functions,
and the optimal solutionwe arrive at this way willbe the same as, if we solved the problem
recursively and treated these decisions as reaction functions of one’s own past decisions
instead. With thissimpliﬁcation, and denotingone period lag value and one period forward





+ respectively, the system of equations (17)-(20) for a






































































































































































































































































































































￿ from equation(21) treat-
ing
n and
s as given, and then solve for
n and
s from equations (23)-(24) after plugging















). This cannot work since
n and
s in equation (21)
are implicit functions of
a















) from equation (21) alone. This is a curse on subgame perfect equilibrium in overlap-
ping generations models. We introduce our local learning equilibrium concept to handle
precisely this computational difﬁculty of the subgame perfect equilibrium, and show that
our equilibrium concept is broad enough to include both open loop and subgame perfect
equilibrium as particular types of learning equilibria, and show a way to compute subgame
perfect equilibriumas the long-run limit of certain type of learning equilibriumpaths.
3.2 Local learning equilibrium and local subgame perfect equilibrium
Let us denote by
S the sum of savings in physical capital











: Notice that around a steady-state gift equilibrium,
S is a function of
a
w


























































use against their parents in case parents induce them to choose an
a which is different but
in a neighborhood of the equilibrium
a
￿









; and we assume that the nature of threat they apply to their parents
is learned from observing their parents’ behavior towards their grand parents and from












; which is a




















￿from equations(21)-(24). We name this
equilibriumas a steady-state local learninggift equilibrium. More formally,






































































































































































) from equation (25).



























; we can studythelocal dynamicsof


















































) and so on. But we do not carry
out any further analysis along this line.
For a steady-state local learning gift equilibrium corresponding to
￿
0
























:Notice that a local learning gift equilibrium need not be






) need not be equal to
￿
0
￿.H o w -











:Thus we establish that a local subgame perfect gift equilibrium is a particu-
lar type of local learning gift equilibrium and it can be easily computed as a ﬁxed point of






). We may have multiple steady-statelocal subgame
16perfect gift equilibria, which one to select? (see ﬁgure 2).We use a learning equilibrium
selection criterion as follows:





;buttheylearn toupdatetheirthreat strategybased ontheirparent’sexperiences









); and suppose this updating is according to







; then such a
dynamic learning equilibrium path will converge to a steady-state subgame perfect equi-
librium in the long-run. There could be, however, many such algorithms; which learning
algorithm will be more appropriate in describing human learning is an empirical question.























: In the long-run the learning equilibrium path will converge
to a locally stable ﬁxed points of




0 was close to such a ﬁxed
point. Let us call a locally stable ﬁxed point of
￿ as a stable steady-state local subgame
perfect equilibrium. Using the learning criterion, we can eliminate unstable equilibria and
select only the stable subgame perfect equilibria as reasonable. In our numerical example
for CEM economy we will see that this leads to a unique equilibrium selection of steady-
state local subgame perfect gift equilibria.
Itisimportanttonotethatwe have beenable toreducean intractableproblemofﬁnding
subgame perfect equilibrium,involvingcomputationof a ﬁxed pointin functionsspaces, to
a simpler problem.
3.3 Properties of steady-state gift equilibria








: These results are also true, in particular, for any local subgame






1 (this is true for instance, for the
CEM economy in our numerical example that follows). The following proposition shows
that the equilibrium reaction of children to parents’ higher savings is to reduce old-age
support to their parents.








































































































17Hence the ﬁrst part followsfrom the implicit functiontheorem. Usingthe implicit function



































































While the effect of parents savingsis negative on the transfers from children, the corre-

















) is an increasing function of
n. Proceeding in the











































































Note that both bracketed terms in the above are negative and the ﬁrst term of the numerator
is positive. Thus the sign of the right hand side of the above partial derivative will depend
on the relative magnitudes of the bracketed terms and the ﬁrst term on the numerator. In
the numerical example for CEM economy that we consider later, the right hand side is
unambiguously negative, which means that if parents have more children, they will receive
less gifts from each child.
The following proposition ﬁnds condition under which a local learning equilibrium is
also a open-loop gift equilibrium in the steady-state.






also a steady-state open-loopgift equilibrium


























; and thus it follows from equations (21)-(24) and equation (25)
that theequilibriumconditionsfor the steady-statelocal learningequilibriumisthe same as
the conditionsfor steady-state open-loop gift equilibrium.
Q.E.D.





1 leads to open-loop
Nash equilibriumbut it is incredible since it soundslike:
”if his parents choose levels of fertility and saving different from that are pre-





￿and thus induce him to
transfer more (resp. less) amount than that is prescribed by open-loop Nash
equilibrium, he will consume nothing (resp. consume everything that he has,
and if necessary he will borrow against his children) during his adult age.”
18A feasible steady-state allocation is said to be Pareto Optimal if there does not exist
another feasible steady-state allocation that gives higher utilityto a representative agent. 6


















0and no bequest constraint, (10), holds as a strict inequality,








































then all agentscan be made better-off with a suitably designed pay-as-you-go social secu-
rity program. Hence such an equilibriumis not Pareto optimal.
Proof. Consider a pay-as-you-go social security program which marginally taxes all adult
agents and redistributes the revenues equally among their old parents. Suppose for the
moment that agents do not change their fertility and savings decisions in response to in-




























) , where the ﬁrst term corresponds to welfare loss due to fall in own
adult-ageconsumptionand thesecondterm correspondstothewelfare lossduetoreduction













































































































In deriving the above we have used equation (21) and the fact that equation (10) is a strict
inequalityby assumption.
It is clear that if the agents optimally adjust their fertility and savings decisions, the
gains in utilitywill be even higher.
Q.E.D.
Social security can improve Pareto efﬁciency of a steady-state subgame perfect gift
equilibrium provided no bequest condition7 (10) is a strict inequality. If the no-bequest
conditionis an equality, introductionof social security cannot improve Pareto efﬁciency.
6This is a modiﬁed version of Pareto Optimality, modiﬁed to take into account the problem of comparing
non-existing individuals’ utilities under two different feasible steady-state allocations. See Raut [1990] for a
discussion of this problem and the related literature on this issue.
7This is a stronger condition for no-bequest in the subgameperfect equilibrium since (10) implies (22).
193.4 The CEM Example Continued
































































































using the Maple V Software. For all the values of
￿
0
￿ we found two equilibria one with
s
=




;and the former equilibrium always produced higher







;the local learning equilibrium of each type tends to the steady-state open loop
gift equilibrium of the corresponding type given in the previous section. In the ﬁrst row of







(other parameters are as in the previous numerical example).



































































































































































































A row with * corresponds to the stable subgame perfect equilibrium.











































1 converged to a stable local sub-


















5, the equilibrium allocation is shown
inthe secondrow of table2. For thecase
s
>
0none of thesequences of learningequilibria






: Thus for a wide class
of CEM economies (at least for the wide range of parameter values that we considered),
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Figure 3: Phase diagram of learning equilibriumfor numerical CEM economy
214 Social security and its effects
We have seen in our previous results that parents do have incentives to manipulate to re-
ceive a higher percentage of their children’s income transferred to them. In this section
we examine the effects of introducing a pay-as-you-go social security which can directly
reduce or even eliminatethe need for manipulationto effect old-age supports. We studythe
effects of social securityon the rate of voluntaryold-age transfers, fertility, savings,both at
the individualleveland the aggregate level. We illustratetheseeffects usingCEM economy
for analytical simplicity.
Let us suppose that a pay as you go social security program is introduced so that, apart
from making decisions regarding savings, fertility, bequest and old-age gifts to parents as




















1 depends on agent t’s number of children
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; but he takes it







































































































;and itis notnecessarily equal to
￿
1
: That is social security
does not perfectly crowd-out private transfers. It is not possible to analytically derive the




; we found that the effect
of
￿ on fertility is always negative. Thus we may conclude that if a society consistsof two
groups of people, for one group bequest being operative and for the other group, old-age
gift transfers being operative, and thus each individualin theﬁrst grouphas positivesavings
and thesecond grouphas zero savings. Now supposea PAYGis introduced. Let us suppose
that the agents in theﬁrst category fullyoff-set theprogram’s effect offorced transfers from
children to parents by transferring an equal amount to their children (as in Barro [1974] for
instance),withoutchanginganyotherdecisions.8 Theagentsintheothercategory, however,
willreducetheirvoluntaryold-agegifttransfers,willhavelesschildren,andwillcontinueto
have zero savings. Thus the effect of such social security on the aggregate economy would
be to reduce the populationgrowth, and total savings; the per capita savings, however, will
be increased. The effect on savings rate will depend on whether the total savings declines
more thanGDP ornot. In a more general settingwithendogenoushumancapitalformation,
it may be possible to establish that the negative effect of social security on fertility level of
the second category of agents leads to more investment in human capital of their children
8In our set-up, this Ricardo-Barro neutrality effect of social security may not hold for agents with operative
bequests. I have not examined it either in this paper.
22through ”quality-quantity trade-off ” (which is a universally observed phenomenon) and
thus may have positive effect on long-run growth.
Wehaveassumedinourmainanalysisthatparentscannotleaveadebttobepaidbytheir





; not negative. Suppose we allow
s
t to be negative,
i.e., some parents are net dissavers in the society(which is observed for some agents in less
developed countries), then social security may reduce the magnitude of dissavingsof these
agents and the aggregate savingsmight even go-up as a result.
In our view, one of the motives for introduction of social security is to overcome the
incentives to throw oneself to the mercy of the younger generation in old-age. Our view of
socialsecurityisdifferentfrom thesocialinsuranceviewputforwardby Diamond-Mirrlees
[1978] and others. The purpose of social security is clearly more to force people to save
for their retirement since we all know that we would not be able to let the elderly live
miserably if they do not save for their retirement. Our view of social security is close to the
social conscience view except that in our context the social conscience is extended to the
family members only.
In our model, similar to Veall [1986], social security beneﬁts and taxes are endoge-
nously determined. As in the Hansson and Stuart model, a social security tax-beneﬁts
stream for the current as well as all future generations that is implied by the subgame per-




future generations will have incentives to change it.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have considered a pure exchange overlapping generationsmodel withtwo-
sided limited altruism in the sense that agents care not only about their own life-cycle con-
sumption, but they also care about their parents’ old-age consumption and their children’s
adult-age consumption. In our economy agents decide their levels of fertility, savings, and
transfers of resources to parents and children. We argue that the commonly used open-loop
Nash equilibrium does not fully take into account the incentives that agents may have to
manipulate their children’s or parents’ behavior to effect higher rate of transfers.
We use more appropriate sequential multi-stage game in extensive form to model the
manipulative behavior of agents and the notion of subgame perfect equilibrium to char-
acterize the optimal manipulative behaviors. Our analysis is locally around steady-state
equilibria. We show that there may exist multiple subgame perfect equilibria, and it is gen-
erally not possible to select a particular subgame perfect equilibrium as more reasonable
description of actual behavior than other equilibria; furthermore, computation of subgame
perfect equilibria in overlapping generations framework has been problematic since it in-
volves computationof ﬁxed pointsin functionspaces, and thusstudyingthegeneral proper-
ties of subgame perfect equilibria has been extremely cumbersome. We introduce a notion
of local learning equilibrium, rationalizingit to describe a form of boundedrational human
23behavior in the sense that children learn certain behaviors from their parents or neighbors.
We demonstrate that the computation of local subgame perfect equilibrium reduces to an
easier problem of ﬁnding a particular type of local learning equilibrium, which is, indeed,
a ﬁxed point of a function of a single variable. We also show that a set of local learning
equilibrium paths converge to local subgame perfect equilibrium in the long-run; we name
such subgame perfect equilibrium as stable. Using this as a reasonable equilibrium selec-
tion criterion, we demonstrate that for a class of CEM (i.e., constant elasticity of marginal
utility) economies this criterion selects a unique local subgame perfect equilibrium out of
two local subgame perfect gift equilibria.
We further show that for all types of equilibria, the equilibrium rate of old-age support
to parents depend negatively with their parents’ savings and the number of children (the
latter is true for CEM economy). The total amount of transfers from children may go
down as parents choose more children, and this is in contrast to the traditional view of old-
age security view for child bearing. Thus with a manipulative behavior of choosing less
savings, and more or less children, depending on the economy, agents can extract higher
rate of old-age support from children. For the CEM economy, the stable local subgame
perfect equilibrium has zero savings, higher fertility and old-age support and it is Pareto
superior as compared to the other subgame perfect equilibriumwith positivesavings. Thus
bymanipulation,individualscan effecthigherrateofold-agesupportsfromchildrenandfor
this a social security may not be necessary. In our view, one of the reasons for introduction
of socialsecurityis toovercome the incentivestothrowoneself tothe mercy of the younger
generation in old-age. We have also examined the effect of social security on subgame
perfect equilibriumrate of populationgrowth and aggregate savings rate.
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